The Right Kind of Regulatory Excellence

A regulator seeking to be “best in class” may, understandably, wish to maximize as many different operational, institutional, and interpersonal virtues as possible.  But what if increasing one virtue inexorably decreases its opposite, when that opposite is also needed to be truly excellent?  Should (and can) a regulator be both meticulous and nimble? Is it possible for a regulator to be both flexible and firm? These are some of the questions asked by Adam Finkel in a chapter of the newly published book Achieving Regulatory Excellence. Finkel, a senior fellow at the Penn Program on Regulation and a former senior executive at the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), argues that inherent tradeoffs in most well-accepted regulatory virtues mean that excellent regulators must succeed in exhibiting the correct—and correctly balanced—virtues. Much of Finkel’s chapter is organized around various observations about when an…

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