Courts, at least in the Ninth Circuit, have collapsed the distinction between Sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2). As a result, (c)(1) now routinely protects a service’s content filtering and account restriction decisions, which is nominally the job of (c)(2). This is ultimately good news, or at least not bad news, because (c)(1) bypasses (c)(2)’s problematic “good faith” requirement. Still, if you’re confused about why (c)(1) is being used to cover exactly the factual circumstances contemplated by (c)(2), you probably aren’t alone. (And this development has undermined my paper on 230(c)(2) and online account terminations from 2011). This case involves Sadek Raouf Ebeid’s Facebook pages that he used for advocacy purposes. He alleges that Facebook suppressed the visibility of those pages and his ability to post to them, including removing posts, restricting account login, and not boosting the pages when promoted. He claims that he appealed…
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