Klerman on Reputational Economies of Scale

Daniel M. Klerman  (USC Gould School of Law) has posted  Reputational Economies of Scale on SSRN.  Here is the abstract: For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives is positively correlated with the frequency of repeat play. Firms that sell more products or services were thought more likely to be trustworthy than those that sell less because they have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. That assumption has been called into question by recent work that shows that, under the standard infinitely repeated game model of reputation, reputational economies of scale will occur only under special conditions, such as monopoly, because larger firms not only have more to lose from behaving badly, but also more to gain. This article argues that reputational economies of scale exist even when there is competition and without other special conditions, if the probability of detection is positively…

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