Faggion on Dworkin on Association and Political Obligations

Andrea Faggion (State University of Londrina) has posted Why a Hedgehog Cannot Have Political Obligation on SSRN.  Here is the abstract: According to Ronald Dworkin, political obligation is to be justified as an associative obligation through membership in certain political communities. In this regard, first, I argue that the concept of an associative obligation cannot help us to account for precise moral obligations. Second, I analyze certain disanalogies between paradigmatic cases of associative obligation and political obligation in order to show the inability of the former to justify the enforcement of a comprehensive obligation such as the latter. Finally, I argue that Dworkin could not have provided a better argument: his theory of law makes him incapable of justifying political obligation.

Read more detail on Recent Legal Theory posts –

This entry was posted in Legal Theory. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply