Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol Hans-Theo Normann (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics) has posted Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence. ABSTRACT: The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure…

Read more detail on Recent Business Law Posts –

Legal notice about the Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence rubric : Hukuki Net Legal News is not responsible for the privacy statements or other content from Web sites outside of the Hukuki.net site. Please refer the progenitor link to check the legal entity of this resource hereinabove.

Do you need High Quality Legal documents or forms related to Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence?

This entry was posted in Business law and tagged , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply