Stephanopoulos on Accountability & Constitutional Law

Nicholas Stephanopoulos (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law (Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 112, No. 5, 2018) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract: Several of the Supreme Court’s most controversial constitutional doctrines hinge on claims about electoral accountability. Restrictions on the President’s power to remove agency heads are disfavored because they reduce the President’s accountability for agency actions. Congress cannot delegate certain decisions to agencies because then Congress is less accountable for those choices. State governments cannot be federally commandeered because such conscription lessens their accountability. And campaign spending must be unregulated so that more information reaches voters and helps them to reward or punish incumbents for their performances. There is just one problem with these claims. They are wrong—at least for the most part. To illustrate…

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